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Abstract
This Note will examine the tax exemption for property used in religious worship in its English
and American settings. Analysis of the scope of the exemption in England will review the history
of the exemption and its present application. The discussion of the exemption in the United States
will focus on constitutional considerations. The theism test will also be considered in light of the
principles underlying the exemption in both countries. The Note will conclude by recommending
the analogy test for both England and the United States as an alternative to the theism test.
REJECTING THE THEISM TEST IN ENGLAND
AND THE UNITED STATES IN PROPERTY
TAX EXEMPTION CASES
INTRODUCTION
The definition of religion for property tax exemption purposes
has become an issue for the courts as a result of municipal budget-
ary constraints' and increasing religious pluralism .2 Courts in En-
gland and some courts in the United States, when faced with the
issue, have recently applied a theism test, which rejects creeds that
do not include a deity.3 The use of that test raises three basic issues:
1. Municipal and domestic fiscal pressure have contributed to the careful scrutiny given
those granted tax exempt status. Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations: A Perspective, 53 TEMp. L.Q. 291, 292-96 (1980). The Legislature of New
York State moved to limit such exemptions for both religious and nonreligious groups when a
committee report predicted that within 15 years, half of the real property in the state would
be exempt. Note, Real Property Tax Exemption in New York: When is a Bible Society not
Religious?, 45 FoRDHAM L. Rzv. 949, 950 (1977) (citing 15 N.Y. Legis. Doc. 20 (1970)). In a
slightly different context, Lord Upjohn noted that "the 'spirit and intendment' of the pream-
ble of the Statute of Elizabeth have been stretched almost to breaking point. . . . Now that it
is used so frequently to avoid the common man's liability to rates or taxes, this generous trend
of the law may one day require reconsideration." Scottish Burial Reform & Cremation Soc'y,
Ltd. v. Glasgow City Corp., 1968 A.C. 138, 153 (premises of Society held used by charity for
charitable purposes).
2. One British commentator referred to the new religious pluralism in his country as
rooted in the "swinging sixties" and arriving when "the enthusiasms of California and
Greenwich Village . .. reached our shores .... Picarda, New Religions as Charities, 131
NEw L.J. 436, 436 (1981). Many of the new religions are controversial, perceived as amassing
great fortunes for their leaders and brainwashing their followers. See Rudin, The Cult
Phenomenon: Fad or Fact?, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 17(1980). See generally Heins,
"Other People's Faiths": The Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud,
9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153 (1981). A list of such controversial movements would include
Scientology, the Unification Church, (followers of Reverend Sun Myung Moon), the Hare
Krishna movement, The Way International and The Body of Christ. Rudin, supra, at 21-22
n.28. New York's highest court recently reinstated the tax-exempt status of property belong-
ing to the Unification Church. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v.
Tax Comm'n, 55 N.Y.2d 512, 435 N.E.2d 662, 450 N.Y.S.2d 292(1982).
3. See, e.g., Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837
(Mo. 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803 (1978). The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed
the finding of the Tax Commission, holding that religion required "a belief in and devotion to
a Supreme Being." Id. at 840. The court concluded that Scientology fell short of that
standard. Id. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying test. The Church of Scientology
suffered the same fate in England. Regina v. Registrar Gen. ex parte Segerdal, [1970] 2 Q.B.
697 (C.A.). The Church has not lost all such battles. In Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969), it successfully
defended itself against charges that its literature qualified as mislabelling of "E-meters." Id.
at 1161. "E-meters" are a type of skin galvanometer that Scientologists use in "auditing," id.
at 1153, their primary therapeutic procedure. Id. at 1149-50. The government brought the
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how to define God, 4 whether the test is appropriate within the
nation's legal framework, 5 and whether the theism test serves the
purposes of the exemption.6
English and American jurists attempting to apply a theism test
face a formidable task: defining God. 7 The judiciary claims no
expertise on the subject." Those who have made religion their life's
study describe God as unfathomable. Without an authoritative
definition of God, the theism test may exclude theistic sects or
charges under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976).
Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1148. The court concluded if the movement
was a religion the literature was its scripture. Id. at 1159. The court noted that the Church
"has ministers, who are licensed as such, with legal authority to marry and to bury. Its
fundamental writings contain a general account of man and his nature comparable in scope,
if not in content, to those of some recognized religions." Id. at 1160 (footnote omitted). The
court held that the Church had made out a prima facie case for religious status which the
government had not challenged. Id.The fact that "it postulates no deity in the conventional
sense," the court concluded, "does not preclude its status as a religion." Id. (footnote
omitted). Scientology is not the only movement to suffer under the theism test. The South
Place Ethical Society failed in its attempt to attain judicially recognized religious status when
the court applied the theism test. In re South Place Ethical Soc'y, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565
(Ch.). "The society is non-theistic, like all other ethical movements. The existence of God is
neither affirmed nor denied." Id. at 1569. Similar movements have achieved religious status
in American jurisdictions applying a test similar to the one used in Founding Church of
Scientology. See Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394
(1957). See infra notes 93-96, 107-13 and accompanying text.
4. The test does not require a complete definition of God. It does require definition of
God to the extent that the belief in question could not possibly refer to God. See infra notes
128-37 and accompanying text.
5. In the United States, that framework consists primarily of the constitutional guaran-
tees of religious freedom. See infra notes 69-120, 138-54 and accompanying text. In England,
the history of religious freedom and present policy comprise the background for consideration
of the theism test. See infra notes 22-53, 138-54 and accompanying text.
6. In the United States, the state's purposes in exempting property used for religious
worship include the moral and mental advancement of the community, the promotion of
pluralism within the community and the avoidance of church-state entanglement. Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In England, the state's purposes do not include avoidance
of entanglement, but include the advancement of religion. See Neville Estates, Ltd. v.
Madden, 1962 Ch. 832, 853 (1961). See infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
7. In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, "James Madison
labeled the suggestion that 'the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth' an
,arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinion of Rulers in all ages, and through-
out the world."' L. TIuBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 871-72 (1978)(quoting 2 THE
WRITING OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). See infra notes 128-37 and accompa-
nying text.
8. Lord Justice Winn conceded as much in Regina v. Registrar Gen. ex parte Segerdal,
[1970] 2 Q.B. 697, 708 (C.A.).
9. "God is ... beyond all categories . P. TILLICH, A HISTORY OF CHISTIAN
THOUGHT 115 (1968). See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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include nontheistic sects. ' 0 The courts have already described creeds
as "nontheistic" whose descriptions of God are indistinguishable
from those of some Christian theologians."
Failure to define God adequately implies that the theism test
may reject some theistic religions. It thus results in state discrimina-
tion among religions on theological grounds. Such discrimination,
and therefore the theism test, contravenes the mandates of the
United States Constitution and of English policy toward religion.
The religion clauses of the United States Constitution guarantee
free exercise of religion and the freedom from state establishment of
religion.'2 English law does not contain similar overriding guaran-
tees. 1 Yet despite the lack of constitutional guarantees and the
existence of an established church, English policy is one of general
religious freedom. 14
In a legal system that does not discriminate among religions,
the theism test frustrates some of the purposes for which the state
grants the exemption. The moral and mental improvement of the
community' 5 is not promoted by a test that places nontheistic
10. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
11. Buddhism conceives of "supreme Reality," United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
191 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring), and Ethical Culture of "'the highest ideal that [man]
can conceive.' " Id. at 183 (quoting S. MuzzEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION 95 (1951)). Such
concepts are similar to protestant theologian Paul Tillich's "power of being, which works
through those who have no name for it, not even the name God." 2 P. TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGy 12 (1957) quoted in Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180. See infra notes 134-37 and accompa-
nying text.
12. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. The British Constitution, which is unwritten, prevents the enactment of guarantees
that would take precedence over subsequent legislation. Parliament is omnicompetent; noth-
ing, not even a previous act of Parliament, can inhibit Parliamentary action. Consequently,
judicial review does not exist in Great Britain as it does in the United States where an act of
Congress contravening the Constitution of the United States may be declared void by the
courts.O.H. PHILLIPS & P. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 447 (6th ed.
1978); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Proposals for a declaration of
rights that would not purport to limit future Parliamentary action are being debated. O.H.
PHILLIPS & P. JACKSON supra, at 446-49. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230, which provides for religious freedom, is
considered persuasive by English courts. Ahmad v. Inner London Educ. Auth., 1978 Q.B.
36, 41 (C.A.). It is not part of the law, and Lord Denning descilbed it as too vague to be of
much practical use. Id.
14. Neville Estates Ltd. v. Madden, 1962 Ch. 832 (1961). "As between different reli-
gions the law stands neutral .... Id. at 853. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
15. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970). The Court described the
exemption of churches as proper because they belong to the larger class of exempt institutions
fostering the moral and mental improvement of the community.
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groups advancing those aims on the tax rolls. The inclusion of only
one type of religion does not foster pluralism within the commu-
nity.16 Distinguishing among faiths based upon their beliefs does
not minimize church-state entanglement. 17 In place of minimizing
church-state involvement, England seeks to foster religion through
the exemption. The theism test frustrates that aim as well. It leaves
on the tax rolls both religions misidentified as nontheistic and reli-
gions similar to Buddhism, but less well known.'
Jurisdictions employing the theism test are not without an
alternative. Many American jurisdictions have rejected the theism
test as unconstitutional, adopting some form of analogy test.' 9 Such
a test allows tax exemption for institutions filling a place in the lives
of their members and a role in society analogous to the place filled
by institutions admittedly qualifying for the exemption. 20 The test is
particularly well adapted to property tax disputes. In that context,
the test avoids the probing of personal beliefs that plagues similar
tests when applied to the claims of individuals as in conscientious
objector cases.2 1 The 'test is consistent with the purposes of the
exemption because it focuses on the institution's ability to fulfill
those purposes rather than the institution's internal affairs.
16. See id. at 693 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan concluded that religion's
unique contribution to the pluralism of the community justified its tax exempt status based
upon its religious activities.
17. See. id. at 673-74. The Court held that minimizing harmful entanglement of church
and state was among the constitutional justifications for the exemption.
18. English courts have described Buddhism as an exception to the theism requirement.
Regina v. Registrar Gen. ex parte Segerdal, [1970] 2 Q.B. 697, 707 (C.A.). See infra note 150
and accompanying text. The establishment clause prohibits any state action the intent or
primary effect of which is the promotion of religion. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
19. See, e.g., Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d
394 (1957).
20. Fellowship of Humanity, 153 Cal. App. 2d at 698, 315 P.2d at 409-10.
The real question is whether the activities of the Fellowship of Humanity which in
the above sense are "nonreligious," [not including a Supreme Being] and which
include all of the Fellowship's activities, are analogous to the activities, serve the
same place in the lives of its members, and occupy the same place in society, as the
activities of the theistic churches.
Id.
21. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1972). The Court conceded the
difficulty and necessity of determining whether the beliefs in question were of a religious
nature. The Court then noted the religious nature of the beliefs of the Old Order Amish,
evidenced by expert testimony, the fact that they are shared by an organized group and the
long and consistent history of adherence to those beliefs. The Court contrasted them to the
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This Note will examine the tax exemption for property used in
religious worship in its English and American settings. Analysis of
the scope of the exemption in England will review the history of the
exemption and its present application. The discussion of the exemp-
tion in the United States will focus on constitutional considerations.
The theism test will also be considered in light of the principles
underlying the exemption in both countries. The Note will conclude
by recommending the analogy test for both England and the United
States as an alternative to the theism test.
I. THE EXEMPTION IN ENGLAND: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT SCOPE
Anglican churches have been exempt from real property taxes
since the adoption of the Poor Relief Act of 1601.22 The expansion of
the exemption to include analogous property of other faiths fol-
lowed the expansion of religious tolerance in general. Parliament
allowed different religions to practice openly according to two
criteria: first, it liberated sects according to their similarity to the
established church, and second, it rejected sects it saw as a threat to
the Realm .23 Initially, only the established church was exempt from
property taxation.2 4 The exemption was not statutory but de
facto.25 A number of rationales have been offered for the practice,
from reluctance to tax holy ground28 to the fact that the parish was
the taxing unit, 27 and therefore taxing the church would merely
transfer money from one pocket to another. The question of ex-
empting a broader range of religions was moot because the Church
of England was the only legally recognized religion. 28 Parliament
philosophical and personal beliefs of Thoreau. Id. Justice Douglas saw the court's analysis as
a repudiation of United*States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Yoder, 406 U.S. at 248-49
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Seeger concerned a claim of conscientious objector status.
See infra'notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
22. Poor Relief Act, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2. "After passing of the Poor Relief Act, 1601,
churches were, in fact, not rated [taxed]." Henning v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 1964 A.C. 420, 437.
23. General exemption for all places of religious worship did not come about until 1855.
See supra note 22 and infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
24. Henning, 1964 A.C. at 432.
25. Id.
26. See Henning, 1964 A.C. at 437.
27. Poor Relief Act, 1601, § 1; 1964 A.C. at 437.
28. See Act of Uniformity, 1558, 1 Eliz., ch. 2. The Act reinstituted the Book of
Common Prayer as the sole permissible liturgy and required all to attend services of the
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codified the exemption in 1833, extending its coverage to sects
previously granted official recognition and the right to maintain a
house of worship. 29 That group included only Christian denomina-
tions. 30 Parliament extended recognition to Judaism in 184631 and
to religion in general in 1855.32
established church. Id. §§ 4, 8, 27. The Act of Uniformity, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 4,
reinstituted statutory disabilities for all but the established church. Relief from those disabili-
ties began with Protestant Trinitarians. Toleration Act, 1688, 1 W. & M., ch. 18, §§ 2, 17. As
late as 1926, disabilities remained for adherents of traditional religions other than the
established church. Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 55. Certain
disabilities remain, but they relate directly to the administration of the Church of England.
The Jews Relief Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., ch. 49, forbids "any person professing the Jewish
religion . . . to advise Her Majesty . . . concerning the appointment to or disposal of any
office. . . in the. . . Church of England." Id. § 4. The Sovereign must be a member of the
Church of England. Act of Settlement, 1700, 12,& 13 Will. 3, ch. 2, § 3. By the nineteenth
century, lack of recognition did not imply that a religious body could not maintain a suit for
breach of contract. Israel v. Simmons, 171 Eng. Rep. 671 (K.B. 1818) (suit for arrears on
seats in a synagogue). As Lord Parker of Waddington noted in Bowman v. Secular Soc'y,
Ltd., 1917 A.C. 406 (attack upon Christianity not blasphemous absent scurrilous language),
lack of recognition did not imply that a religion of the Judeo-Christian tradition was not
recognized at common law. His analysis of DaCosta v. DePas, 27 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754),
revealed that the common law recognized Judaism as a religion. Bowman, 1917 AC. at 443.
DaCosta concerned, inter alia, the disposal of a bequest for readings of Jewish Law. The
crown applied the funds "towards supporting a preacher, and to instruct the children... in
the Christian religion." 27 Eng. Rep. at 151-52. The court applied the prerogative cy pres
doctrine, which allowed the crown to apply a charitable gift, unenforceable at law, to a
similar, lawful charity. See G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS 523-27 (5th ed. 1973); Moggridge v.
Thackwell, 32 Eng. Rep. 15, 22-23 (Ch. 1803) (explaining DaCosta v. DePas). See also Cary
v. Abbot, 32 Eng. Rep. 198 (M.R. 1802) (similar disposition of trust originally intended for
education of children in the Roman Catholic faith).
29. The Poor Rate Exemption Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 30, § 1, excluded from
taxation
any Churches, District Churches, Chapels, Meeting Houses, or Premises, or such
Part thereof as shall be exclusively appropriated to public Religious Worship, and
which (other than Chruches, District Churches, and Episcopal Chapels of the
Established Church) shall be duly certified for the Performance of such Religious
Worship according to the Provision of any Act or Acts now in force.
Id.
30. The following denominations were allowed, in fact, required to certify their houses
of worship. Protestant Trinitarians were recognized initially by virtue of the Toleration Act,
1688, 1 W. & M., ch. 18, § 19, and subsequently under the Places of Worship Registration
Act, 1812, 52 Geo. 3, ch. 155, § 2. Protestant non-Trinitarians, for example, Unitarians,
achieved official recognition through An Act to relieve Persons who impugn the Doctrine of
the Holy Trinity from certain Penalties, 1813, 53 Geo. 3, ch. 160, that repealed the portions
of previous acts requiring belief in the Trinity, e.g., Toleration Act, 1688, § 17. Roman
Catholics achieved essential recognition through the Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1791, 31
Geo. 3, ch. 32, §§ 4-5, and through the Roman Catholic Charities Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4,
ch. 115, § 1. But see supra note 28.
31. Religious Disabilities Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 59, § 2.
32. Places of Worship Registration Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., ch. 81. In addition to the
"Protestant Dissenters," "Protestants" and "persons professing the Roman Catholic religion"
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The second criterion, the safety and well-being of the Realm,
revealed itself through the continued suppression of Roman Cathol-
icism for 100 years after the toleration of Protestant Nonconformist
Trinitarians. 33 Loyalty oaths were required of the members of toler-
ated sects .34 With the explicit exception of the Society of Friends
(Quakers), religious groups were forbidden to hold services behind
locked doors.35
The two criteria, similarity to the established church and the
security of the Realm, determine the nature of the exemption as
well as which creeds qualify. In Henning v. Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints, 36 the House of Lords refused to require the
Registrar to include the Temple of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints among tax exempt houses of worship. 37 English
law recognizes the Mormon Church as a Christian sect, 38 and its
chapels are exempt from taxation .39 The Church conducts its sacred
ordinances in the Temple. 40 The Temple, however, is not open to
the public at large but only to "members of the church in good
standing."'41 The House of Lords held that the Temple did not
qualify for the exemption because it was not "public" 42 within the
meaning of the statute. 43 Lord Pearce denied one of the Church's
arguments, holding that "public" must be interpreted to require
practices paralleling those of the Church of England. 44 The House
already eligible to certify their places of worship, the Act provided that "persons, professing
the Jewish religion" might certify their places of worship, and "every place of meeting for
religious worship of any other body or denomination of persons, may be certified in writing
to the Registrar." Id. § 2.
33. See supra note 30.
34. See, e.g., Toleration Act, 1688, 1 W. & M., ch. 18, § 2.
35. Id. §§ 9, 13; Places of Religious Worship Act, 1812, 52 Geo. 3, ch. 155, §§ 11, 14.
The requirement was based on considerations of political security. Henning v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 1964 A.C. 420, 439.
36. 1964 A.C. 420.
37. Id. at 441.
38. Id. at 430.
39. Id. at 434.
40. Id. at 436.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 440.
43. Rating and Valuation (Miscellanous Provisions) Act, 1955, 4 Eliz. 2., ch. 9, § 7(2)(a)
(repealed 1967). "This section applies to ...places of public religious worship .... ' Id.
(emphasis added). Similarly, the current statute, General Rate Act, 1967, ch. 9, § 39, applies
only to "places of public religious worship." Id. (emphasis added).
44. Henning, 1964 A.C.. at 440. Lord Pearce noted that the Rating and Valuation
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, descended directly from the Poor Rate Exemption Act
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of Lords thus rejected the Temple because it was not sufficiently
similar to the established church.
Throughout the twentieth century, the British courts have
declared that the law does not discriminate among religions. 45 Yet,
the two criteria, similarity and security, still operate to determine
what qualifies as religion. The security criterion has contributed to
the exclusion of the Black Muslims from the list of religions recog-
nized by prison authorities. 40 The similarity criterion places broad
theological requirements on religious status. Theism is required,
47
but idolatry would probably be disqualifying. 48 Briefly, "monothe-
istic theism" will do. 49
English law historically has encouraged the practice of reli-
gion. The Acts of Uniformity required church attendance.e Older
acts enfranchising nonestablished sects required attendance at wor-
ship, 51 but allowed the followers of the emancipated sect to attend
of 1833. Id. (discussing the Poor Rate Exemption Act, 1833. Id. (discussing the Poor Rate
Exemption Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 30).
By the Act of 1833 the legislature was intending to extend the privileges of exemp-
tion enjoyed by the Anglican churches to similar places of worship belonging to
other denominations. Since the Church of England worshipped with open doors and
its worship was in that sense public, it is unlikely that the legislators intended by the
word "public" some more subjective meaning which would embrace in the phrase
"public religious "worship" [sic] any congregational worship observed behind doors
closed to the public.
Id.
Lord Evershed analyzed the differences between the relevant portions of the two acts
and found them negligible. Id. at 433. The exemption extended to other denominations must
be the same as the exemption originally possessed by the Church of England. Id. at 440.
45. Bowman v. Secular Soc'y, Ltd., 1917 A.C. 406, 449; In re South Place Ethical
Soc'y, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565, 1570 (Ch.); In re Watson, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1472, 1478-79
(Ch.); Neville Estates, Ltd. v. Madden, 1962 Ch. 832, 853 (1961).
46. Robilliard, Religion in Prison, 130 NEw L.J. 800, 800 (1980).
47. Regina v. Registrar Gen. ex parte Segerdal, [1970] 2 Q.B. 697, 707 (C.A.); In re
South Place Ethical Soc'y, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565 (Ch.).
48. Mitford v. Reynolds, 41 Eng. Rep. 602, 605 (Ch. 1842) (fund for the benefit of the
people of Dacca would not be applied to idolatrous uses). Cf. Roberts v. Ravenwood Church'
of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657, 660 (Ga. 1982) (Satan worship would be rejected). See infra notes
142-47 and accompanying text.
49. Bowman v. Secular Soc'y, Ltd., 1917 A.C. 406, 449. The Chief Justice of the
Georgia Supreme Court recently expressed a similar sentiment in a dissenting opinion.
Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicea, 292 S.E.2d 657, 660-61 (Ga. 1982) (Jordan, C.J.,
dissenting).
50. See, e.g., Act of Uniformity, 1558, 1 Eliz., ch.2, § 14.
51. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1791, 31 Geo. 3, ch. 32, § 9. Required
attendance at religious services ended with the Religious Disabilities Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict.,
ch. 59, § 1.
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services at their own houses of worship. 52 More recently the law
"assumes that any religion is at least likely to be better than
none." 
53
In Regina v. Registrar General ex parte Segerdal,-4 the Court
of Appeals considered the application of Scientologists to have their
chapel registered as a "place of meeting for religious worship. ' 55
Registration would, inter alia, make the chapel eligible for consid-
eration for property tax exemption as a "'place of public religious
worship.'"5 The analysis did not view the adjective "religious" in
isolation but considered the phrase "religious worship" as a unit. 57
The judges unanimously held that Scientology did not qualify, as it
might contain a belief in the spirit of man but no belief in God. 58
Lord Denning described Scientology as "more a philosophy of the
existence of man or of life, rather than a religion. Religious wor-
ship," he continued, "means reverence or veneration of God or of a
Supreme Being." 59
52. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1791, 31 Geo. 3, ch. 32, § 9.
53. Neville Estates, Ltd. v. Madden, 1962 Ch. 832, 853 (1961) (trust for the benefit of
members of a private body, Catford Synagogue, held to be of sufficiently public benefit to
qualify as charitable).
54. [1970] 2 Q.B. 697 (C.A.).
55. Id. at 704; Places of Religious Worship Registration Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., ch.
81, § 2.
56. Segerdal, [1970] 2 Q.B. at 704 (quoting General Rate Act, 1967, ch. 9, § 39).
Certification to the registrar as required under the Places of Religious Worship Registration
Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., ch. 81, does not insure qualification for tax exemption. In Henning
v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 1964 A.C. 420, the House of Lords denied tax
exempt status to the Temple of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints despite its
certification. In addition to certification as a house of religious worship, the Registrar must
satisfy himself that the worship therein is sufficiently public. Id. at 436.
57. Segerdal, [1970] 2 Q.B. at 707.
58. Id. Lord Justice Winn thought that Scientology might be considered a religion in the
ancient sense of "superstition, fear [and] panic about the unknown," but their meetings did
not partake of worship. Id. at 708. Worship would have required that they "humble
themselves in reverence and recognition of the dominant power and control of any entity or
being outside their own body and life." Id. at 709. Lord Justice Buckley noted that worship
required at least "submission to the object worshipped, veneration of that object, praise,
thanksgiving, prayer or intercession." Id. at 709.
59. Id. at 707 (emphasis in original). Lord Denning elaborated on the meaning of
"place of meeting for religious worship" as used in the Places of Religious Worship Registra-
tion Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., ch. 81, § 2, as follows:
It connotes to my mind a place of which the principal use is as a place where people
come together . . . to do reverence to God. It need not be the God which the
Christians worship. It may be another God, or an unknown God, but it must be
reverence to a deity.
[1970] 2 Q.B. at 707.
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION
The court followed Segerdal in In re South Place Ethical Soci-
ety, 0 declaring that advancement of religion was not among the
objects of the Society.6' Judge Dillon found that the Society was
agnostic,62 although it originally had been a religious society.6 3 He
further found no question of the sincerity or integrity of the mem-
bers of the Society. 64 Judge Dillon considered and rejected Ameri-
can cases applying a broader definition of religion.65 He followed
Segerdal66 and rejected the Society's claim of religious status. 7 He
declared: "Religion. . . is concerned with man's relation with God,
and ethics are concerned with man's relations with man. The two
are not the same, and are not made the same by sincere inquiry into
the question: what is God? 6 8
The position currently taken by the English courts follows a
long tradition. That tradition recognized a religion if its theology
was sufficiently similar to that of the established church, and if it
did not threaten the state. Tax exemption followed recognition and
was based on the notion of granting to other denominations a
privilege enjoyed by the established church. Recent English cases
have considered and rejected American cases espousing a broader
definition of religion, following instead their own precedents apply-
ing the theism test.
60. [19801 1 W.L.R. 1565, 1572 (Ch.).
61. Id. at 1573. The court found the objects of the Society to be as follows: "'the study
and dissemination of ethical principles and the cultivation of a rational religious sentiment."'
Id. at 1568. Trustees brought suit asking a declaration that, inter alia, the "trusts on which
the property was held were. . . for the advancement of religion or otherwise charitable" and
that the objects of ihe Society were "for the advancement of religion or otherwise charitable."
Id. at 1567. A declaration in the Society's favor would result, among other things, in a tax
reduction under the General Rating Act, 1967, ch. 10, § 40. The court held that the purposes
of the Society were for the advancement of education and therefore charitable. [1980] 1
W.L.R. 1565, 1577 (Ch.).
62. [1980] 1 W.L.R. at 1569. "They are not atheists, opposed to all belief in any god.
They are agnostic about the existence of any god. . . . The existence of God is neither
affirmed nor denied." Id.
63. See id. at 1579.
64. Id. at 1569.
65. Id. at 1570-73 (rejecting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Washing-
ton Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957)). See infra notes 98-
113 and accompanying text.
66. [1970] 2 Q.B. 6u.
67. South Place Ethical Soc'y, [1980] 1 W.L.R. at 1573.
68. Id. at 1571.
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II. THE EXEMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND
CURRENT SCOPE
The British and American analyses of the scope of religion are
parallel"" in several areas, but often diverge because of the religion
clauses of the United States Constitution .70 Constitutional require-
ments often receive most of an American court's attention when it
considers the religious nature of a group claiming tax exemption.7 1
The constitutional analysis of property tax exemption for houses of
religious worship historically includes two main issues: first,
whether such an exemption is prohibited by the establishment
clause72 or perhaps required by the free exercise clause, 73 and sec-
ond, how the religion clauses affect the application of such an
exemption.
The United States Supreme Court, in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion,74 held that such exemptions are permissible. The decision
rested on four grounds: an exemption is qualitatively different from
a subsidy; 75 there is a long history of such exemptions; 76 they pro-
mote the constitutional objective of state neutrality toward reli-
69. See infra notes 121-64 and accompanying text.
70. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. These clauses are fully applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940).
71. See, e.g., Ideal Life Church v. Washington County, 304 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1981).
72. See supra note 70.
73. See supra note 70.
74. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
75. Id. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 699 (Harlan, J., concurring). See id. at
675. The distinction between a subsidy and an exemption was found significant because the
former " ' forcibly diverts the income of both believers and nonbelievers to churches' while 'in
the case of an exemption, the state merely refrains from diverting to its own uses income
independently generated by the churches through voluntary contributions."' Id. at 691(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development (pt. 2), 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 553 (1968)). Justice Harlan saw
impermissible administrative entanglement in subsidies that he found absent in the exemp-
tion. Id. at 699. (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, however, considered the exemp-
tion a subsidy. Id. at 701 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 676-80; id. at 681-85 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 698 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). In response to Justice Douglas's conclusion that the exemption was "a long step
down the Establishment path," id. at 716 (Douglas, J., dissenting), Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the Court, noted that "the second step has been long in coming." Id. at 678.
Justice Brennan contrasted the long and universal acceptance of the exemption with recently
outlawed prayer in the public schools. Id. at 687 n.7.
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gion, 77 and such exemptions minimize the deleterious entanglement
of government with religion.78
The Court held that nondiscriminatory inclusion of houses of
worship among entities that "foster [the community's] 'moral or
mental improvement,' . . . includ[ing] hospitals, libraries, play-
grounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups,"
did not violate the principle of neutrality.79 Justice Brennan, in his
concurring opinion, described the church's religious activity as con-
tributing to the pluralism of the community. 80 That, he concluded,
was sufficient secular justification for including churches among tax
exempt community service organizations. 81
The Court divided impermissible entanglement into two cate-
gories. 12 The first included programs that by their nature produce
direct government involvement in religious affairs. 83 The second
involved administrative entanglement "calling for official and con-
tinuing surveillance. '8 4 The Court concluded that terminating the
exemption would increase the level of church-state involvement.
85
77. Id. at 669-70. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 674. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 672-73. Justice Harlan laid greater emphasis on that point: "To the extent that
religious institutions sponsor the secular activities that this legislation is designed to promote,
it is consistent with neutrality to grant them an exemption just as other organizations
devoting resources to these projects receive exemptions." Id. at 697 (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 689, 692-93.
81. Id. See id. at 697 (Harlan, J., concurring):
I think, moreover, in the context of a statute so broad as the one before us, churches
may properly receive an exemption even though they do not themselves sponsor the
secular-type activities mentioned in the statute but exist merely for the convenience
of their interested members. As long as the breadth of exemption includes groups
that pursue cultural, moral, or spiritual improvement in multifarious secular ways,
including, I would suppose, groups whose avowed tenets may be antitheological,
atheistic, or agnostic, I can see no lack of neutrality in extending the benefit of the
exemption to organized religious groups.
Id. (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 674-75. See also id. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 674-75. "[G]overnmental involvement, while neutral, may be so direct or in
such degree as to engender a risk of politicizing religion." Id. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(citing Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HA~v. L. REv. 1680 (1969)).
84. 397 U.S. at 674-75. Although Justice Harlan disagreed with the Court's opinion that
basing church exemption on its social welfare programs would produce such entanglement,
he asserted that one of the virtues of the exemption was that "its administration need not
entangle government in difficult classifications of what is or is not religious. ... Id. at 698
(Harlan, J., concurring). The impermissible administrative entanglement theme was
sounded in the parochial school aid cases and was often the factor distinguishing permissible
aid from impermissible aid. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971).
85. 397 U.S. at 674-75. See also id. at 698-99 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The Court condemned the possibility of the church supporting the
state,86 as well as the spectre of tax liens and foreclosures on houses
of worship. 87 The courts have not addressed the possibility that the
Constitution requires an exemption for churches. 88
The Supreme Court has never defined which creeds and
groups are protected and limited by the religion clauses. 89 The
Court's pronouncements during the nineteenth century spoke in
terms of "God" or a "Supreme Being." Theistic terminology contin-
ued throughout the first half of the twentieth century. In 1933,
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes declared: "The essence of reli-
gion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation." 90 The question of excluding non-
theistic religions was not before the court in MacIntosh,1 and
courts have questioned the validity of using Justice Hughes's lan-
guage to exclude them.9 2
86. Id. at 675. See also Freund, supra note 83.
87. Id. at 674.
88. See, e.g., Murray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
89. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
90. United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
91. In MacIntosh, the Court held that a Canadian Baptist minister, who subsequently
became chaplin and a member of the faculty of Yale University, could be refused American
citizenship on the ground that he said that he would refuse to take up arms in a war that he
believed was morally unjustified. Id. at 625-26.
92. Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 683, 315
P.2d 394, 400 (1957).
To attribute to such highly educated men as Hughes, Holmes, Brandeis and Stone
[the four dissenters] an ignorance of Taoism or Comte's humanism, or their denial
that either is a religion if the question had been presented to them, would be an
unwarranted assertion of their ignorance of the history of religious beliefs.
Id. (quoting Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 384 n.2 (9th Cir. 1946) (Denman, C.J.,
dissenting)). Indeed, Chief Justice Hughes's purpose was the expansion of religious freedom,
not its limitation. Similarly, James Madison called religion "the duty we owe our creator," in
an effort to expand the scope of religious liberties in Virginia. James Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in A. STOKES & L. PFE''IS, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNrTED STATEs 56 (1964). In a different spirit, the Supreme Court declared
that "'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the
obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his
will." Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). The Court upheld Davis's conviction for
illegally procuring the vote in the territory of Idaho. The statute denied the vote to anyone
belonging to "an organization ... which teaches, advises, counsels or encourages . . . the
crime of bigamy or polygamy." Id. at 347. Davis was a Mormon; that sect, at the time,
advocated polygamy. Considering Davis's challenge to the statute on free exercise grounds,
the Court declared: "To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense
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The Court's more recent discussions have spoken in terms of a
broader scope for "religion." In Torcaso v. Watkins,9 3 the Court
specifically referred to Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture and
Secular Humanism as "religions ... which do not teach what
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God.
94
The Court declared that government cannot aid religions based
upon a traditional belief in God over others nor aid religion over
non-believers. 5 Although the applicability of that declaration to
the property tax situation has been questioned,96 its similarity to the
principle of neutrality described in Walz v. Tax Commission,
9 7
assures its place in the analysis of the religious property tax exemp-
tion question.
The Court continued in the mold of Torcaso v. Watkins,
9 8
with United States v. Seeger.9 9 Seeger contained a prototype of the
test often employed by courts faced with something questionably
religious. The Seeger Court held that the test for the "religious
training and belief," required of conscientious objectors,100 was
whether the claimed belief "occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualify-
ing for the exemption . . 01
Some have seen a retreat from Seeger in the Court's more
recent decision.10 2 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,10 3 the Court contrasted
of mankind." Id. at 341-42. Davis was one of three cases in which the Court upheld acts of
Congress limiting the rights of Mormons. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879). The Court analogized polygamy to other practices that it viewed as having no base in
religion, notwithstanding the beliefs of their practitioners. Id. at 149. The Court concluded
that "[b]igamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries."
Davis, 133 U.S. at 341.
93. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Torcaso struck down a Maryland law requiring that public
office holders declare a belief in God. Id. at 495.
94. Id. at 495 n.ll.
95. Id. at 495.
96. Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 842-43 n.5
(Mo. 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803 (1978).
97. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). "[C]onstitutional neutrality in this area... is to insure that no
religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited." Id. at 669. See also
id. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring). "Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection
mode of analysis." Id.
98. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
99. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
100. Id. at 164-65.
101. Id. at 176. The Court limited its holding to statutory construction, abjuring the
possible constitutional question. Id. at 165-66.
102. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247-49 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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the "philosophical and personal" opinions of Thoreau with the
"deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group" of the
Amish. 10 4 Limitation of Seeger by the Court in Yoder stems from
the idea that "the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allow-
ing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct
in which society as a whole has important interests.' 105 Yoder rests
primarily on balancing the interests of the state against those of the
individual.106 The theism test does not protect "ordered liberty" or
any other legitimate interest any better than the analogy test.
The Seeger test bears a striking resemblance to the tests used in
Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia10 7 and in Fel-
lowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda.08 In 1957,109 the
courts in the last two cases refused to apply a theistic definition of
religion to determine the applicability of real property tax exemp-
tions. 10 Both cases involved agnostic sects.I' Both courts noted that
the uses of the buildings closely paralleled those of traditional
churches. 112 The courts considered standard linguistic and theologi-
103. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court refused to require the Amish community to comply
with the state's compulsory education laws for its children past the eighth grade. Id. at 207.
The Court described the threatened imposition of criminal penalties on the exercise of
religious practices central to the maintenance of their faith as "precisely the kind of objective
danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent." Id.
at 218.
104. Id. at 216.
105. Id. at 215-16.
106. Id.
107. 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
108. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 698, 315 P.2d 394, 409-10 (1957). See infra notes 167-71 and
accompanying text.
109. A broad definition of religion was explicitly employed long before 1957. In 1896,
six years after Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), the California Supreme Court stated:
Under a constitution which guarantees to all equal liberty of religion and con-
science ..... [l]iberty of conscience and belief is preserved alike to the followers of
Christ, to Buddhist and Mohammedan, to all who think that their tenets alone are
illumined by the light of divine truth; but it is equally preserved to the skeptic,
agnostic, atheist and infidel who says in his heart "There is no God."
Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 471, 44 P. 803, 803-04 (1896).
"110. 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957); 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
111. Washington Ethical Soc'y, 249 F.2d at 128; Fellowship of Humanity, 153 Cal.
App. 2d at 679-80, 315 P.2d at 398.
112. In addition to weekly services paralleling those of traditional churches, as in
Washington Ethical Soc'y, 249 F.2d at 128; Fellowship of Humanity, 153 Cal. App. 2d at
678-79, 315 P.2d at 397, the Washington Ethical Society participated in traditionally church-
related events, such as the naming of children, marriage and burial. 249 F.2d at 128. The
Fellowship of Humanity used its premises for social and community functions similar to those
engaged in by churches in the area. 153 Cal. App. 2d at 679, 315 P.2d at 397-98.
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cal definitions. Both concluded that the failure to fit within those
definitions did not dispose of the legal question.1 3 A number of
decisions have applied such analogy tests in recent years.
1 4
Two recent decisions employing a theism test are Missouri
Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission'" and Roberts v.
Ravenwood Church of Wicca."0 In Missouri Church of Sciento-
logy, the court distinguished the modern decisions of the United
States Supreme Court that many have viewed as mandating a
broader definition of religion." 7 The Missouri court considered an
interpretation of United States v. Seeger"" that required a belief in
God but did not require its denomination as such." 9 The Georgia
Supreme Court seemed to adopt a similar interpretation of
Seeger. 20
Constitutional considerations dominate American decisions on
the scope of religion. The Supreme Court has not clearly established
what criteria the courts may use to determine religious status, and
state courts and lower federal courts have split over the constitu-
tionality of the theism test. The reliance by the test's advocates on
older cases, while ignoring more modern cases, raises grave doubts
about the validity of their position.
113. Washington Ethical Soc'y, 249 F.2d at 129; Fellowship of Humanity, 153 Cal.
App. 2d at 679, 315 P.2d at 399. Both courts also noted that a contrary holding might violate
the United States Constitution. 249 F.2d at 129; 153 Cal. App. 2d at 697, 315 P.2d at 409.
114. See, e.g., Ideal Life Church v. County of Washington, 304 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.
1981). For contexts other than property tax exemption, see Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207
(3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (Science of Creative Intelligence/Transcendental
Meditation taught in public schools); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981)
(rights of prisoner to special diet).
115. 560 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803 (1978).
116. 292 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1982). The theism requirement was not at issue in the case.
The Wiccan Church believes in a deity, but the Chief Justice dissented on the ground that the
Wiccan deity was not the type envisioned by the Georgia legislature. 292 S.E. 2d at 660-61
(Jordan, C.J., dissenting).
117. The Missouri Court distinguished, on their facts, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961) (struck down Maryland law requiring holders of public office to profess belief in God),
and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upheld public transportation for children
attending parochial school). Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560
S.W.2d at 842-43 n.5.
118. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
119. Missouri Church of Scientology, 560 S.W.2d at 842.
120. Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657, 659 (Ga. 1982) (quoting
Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 81 A.D.2d 64,
72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 521, 526 (1981).
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III. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
Use of the theism test in both England and the United States 21
must surmount three interrelated hurdles: the intrinsic difficulty of
defining God, 122 the propriety of such a test within the nation's
legal system 2 3 and the test's ability to achieve the state goals justify-
ing the exemption.12 4 If the judiciary is unable to define God satis-
factorily, the test will violate basic policy in England and constitu-
tional requirements in the United States by discriminating among
religions.121 An adequate definition of God, however, does not free
the test from discrimination among religions.121 Finally, the policiesjustifying the exemption would be better served by a test that
focuses upon the effect of the church on the community rather than
upon its internal workings. 127
A. Defining God
Use of a theism test requires the court to define God. That is
equally true when it considers sects disavowing theistic beliefs and
when it considers sects claiming to believe in God.128 The inherent
difficulty of defining God was a major theme of United States v.
Seeger. 29 The Court's review of the opinions of various theologians
121. E.g., Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1982); Mis-
souri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1977), appealdismissed, 439 U.S. 803 (1978); In re South Place Ethical Soc'y, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565 (Ch.).
122. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
128. Theologian Paul Tillich has noted that the term "God" is a stumbling block for
some. P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948), quoted in United States v.Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965). Cf. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1320 (D.N.J.
1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (the court considered the qualities attributed to
"creative intelligence" and concluded that something possessing them "is given the name 'god'
in common usage.")
129. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Few would quarrel, we think, with the proposition that in no field of human
endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication of
ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions of man's predicament in
life, in death or in final judgment and retribution.
Id. at 174.
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revealed that concepts of God, even among members of orthodox
faiths, are neither static nor uniform.1 30
Religious literature itself is replete with references to man's
ignorance of the nature o- God. Among the Bible's pronouncements
to that effect are the following: "Behold, God is great, and we
know him not .... ."131 "Touching the Almighty, we cannot find
him out . . ",.32 In Hinduism, "the Supreme Being is Brah-
man .... Ultnately, mystically, Brahman must be understood as
without attributes ..... 133
Courts applying a theism test have concluded that neither
Buddhism nor Ethical Culture is theistic. Some Christian theolo-
gians, however, have discussed God in the same terms as have
spokesmen for those two sects. In A History of Christian Thought,
Paul Tillich described Augustine's conception of God: "God is
summa essentia, ultimate being, beyond all categories, beyond all
temporal and spatial things. Even the categories of substance can-
not be used. 1 134 Buddhism conceives of a "'supreme Reality; ...
the eternal, hidden and incomprehensible Peace.' ' 35 That Bud-
dhist conception parallels Augustine's summa essentia. An Anglican
Bishop's declaration that "'we are reaching the point at which the
whole conception of a God "out there,". . . is itself becoming more
of a hindrance than a help, ' "1 3 might well introduce an Ethical
Humanist's conclusion that " 'the "God" that we love is not the
figure on the great white throne, but the perfect pattern, envisioned
by faith, of humanity as it should be, purged of the evil elements
which retard its progress toward "the knowledge, love and practice
and the right."' " 137
130. Id. at 180-82.
131. Job 36:26 (King James).
132. job 37:23 (King James).
133. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 189-90 (Douglas, J., concurring).
134. P. TILLICH, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 115 (1968).
135. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 191 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quot-
ing CONZE, BUDDHISM 38-39 (1959)).
136. Seeger, 380 U.S. at lbl (quoting J. ROBINSON, HONEST TO GOD 15-16 (1963)).
137. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 183 (quoting D.S. MuzzEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION 98 (1951)).
The Court further considered the opinions of Dr. Muzzey:
Dr. David Saville Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture Movement, states ...
that "[e]verybody except the avowed atheists (and they are comparatively few)
believes in some kind of God," and that "The proper question to ask, therefore, is
not the futile one, Do you believe in God? but rather, What kind of God do you
believe in?"
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 182-83 (quoting D.S. MuzzEv, ETHICS AS A RELMGION 86-87 (1951)).
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The theism test distinguishes among sects on the basis of an
incomprehensible being. In the absence of a clear definition of the
underlying concept, God, the courts might distinguish among faiths
on the basis of their expressions of that concept. Courts have de-
scribed creeds as nontheistic whose expressions of that concept are
often indistinguishable from the expressions of spokesmen for con-
cededly theistic religions. The test, therefore, in its conception and
by its results reveals itself beyond judicial administration.
B. The Propriety of the Theism Test '
In the absence of a universally accepted definition of God,
application of the theism test will reject religions that are in fact
theistic, but outside of the definition used. Such discrimination
among sects on the basis of their theology is unconstitutional in the
United States.138 The establishment clause at least prevents govern-
mental favoritism among different conceptions of God. 139 While
state action in England is not limited in that manner, 140 such dis-
crimination conflicts with England's policy of neutrality among
faiths. 141
Perhaps the case most clearly revealing that the theism test
distinguishes between definitions of God rather than between God
and no God is Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca. 142 The
138. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion. ... Id. at 642.
"[O]nly in a theocratic state ... [can] ecclesiastical doctrines measure legal right . Id.
at 654 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
139. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILaERESS 150-56 (1965). A broader interpreta-
tion holds that the establishment clause "withdrew -from the sphere of legitimate legislative
concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief
or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea ...." McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). A denial that the establishment clause
at least proscribes state discrimination between religious sects denies the very foundation of
the clause. "Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other religions, may establish, with the same ease, any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other sects?" James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in A.P. STOK S & L. PrEFFE, CHURCH AND STATE IN
THE UNITED STATES 56-57 (1964).
140. See supra text accompanying note 3.
141. See, e.g., In re South Place Ethical Soc'y, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565 (Ch.). "In a free
country-and I have no reason to suppose that this country is less free than the United States
of America-it is natural that the court should desire not to discriminate between beliefs
deeply and sincerely held ...." Id. at 1571.
142. 292 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1982).
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members of the Ravenwood Church refer to themselves as
"witches" and "warlocks.'1 4 3
In this faith, there is a belief in a deity, but not in the sense of an
anthropomorphic God. Rather, the Wiccan belief is that there is
a primordial, supernatural force which is the creator of the
world and universe and which permeates everything therein. In
the Wiccan faith, there is a deification of this force, and all
individuals are seen as divine sparks from this divinity with a
concommitant moral and ethical responsibility to themselves
and to everything in nature. 144
The majority held that the Wiccan beliefs met the theism require-
ment.145 The Chief Justice dissented: "There is no belief in a deity
in the sense of an anthropomorphic God, only a belief in some
strange supernatural force which permeates the world."'146 That
belief, he concluded, did not meet the test. 47
Presuming an acceptable definition of God, the theism test still
discriminates among religions and thus violates established policy in
England 48 and constitutional strictures in the United States. 149 En-
glish and American courts have described Buddhism as a religion
that does not meet the standard theism test. 50 That position ac-
knowledges that people may adopt religions that do not posit a god
in the Anglo-American tradition. The theism test therefore discrim-
inates against such religions that are not as well known as Bud-
dhism but no less religious.
English experience suggests a further ground for the unconsti-
tutionality of the theism test in the United States. The intrusion of
government into the theological realm would not end with the
initial determination of religious status. The state would have to
143. Id. at 657. Those appellations do not imply the black magic generally associated
with them. "The Wiccan church is not Christian, but it does believe in the teachings of
Christ. It does not believe in the devil." Id. at 658.
144. Id. at 658.
145. Id. at 659-60.
146. Id. at 660 (Jordan, C.J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 660-61 (Jordan, C.J., dissenting).
148. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
149. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). "Neutrality in its application requires
an equal protection mode of analysis." Id. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring).
150. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961); Regina v. Registrar Gen.
ex parte Segerdal, [1970] 2 Q.B. 697, 707 (C.A.).
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monitor the church's beliefs continually for maintenance of the
standard that engendered the court's initial approval. The South
Place Ethical Society originated as a society of "Protestant Dis-
senters" of admittedly religious bent.15 "The Society's beliefs un-
derwent gradual change. . . . Prayer was discontinued . . . . The
upshot is that . . . the society . . . has not been a 'Society of
Protestant Dissenters' at all . .. ",152 Continuous supervision of an
institution's theological orthodoxy is the very type of entanglement
that Walz v. Tax Commission'5 3 sought to prevent by allowing the
exemption. 15 4
C. Policy Considerations
The basic rationale behind the exemption is not the practice of
religion for its own sake but the benefit derived by the community.
In the United States, state advancement of religion is unconstitu-
tional.155 The exemption, therefore, must have secular objects. In
England, the promotion of religion is among the goals of the
state. 1' The promotion of religious worship itself, however, is not
the major rationale behind the exemption for houses of worship.
The House of Lords rejected the claim of the most sacred of the
Mormon houses of worship to tax exempt status because it did not
admit the public at large.15 7 It is not, therefore, the religious act
within but the benefit to the community that engenders exempt
status.
In neithur country does community benefit require the use of a
"social welfare yardstick."1 58 The institution need not feed the poor
or shelter the homeless to qualify. Its religious functions satisfy the
community benefit standard by contributing to the mental and
emotional well-being of its members, 15 9 by adding to the pluralism
151. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565, 1578-79.
152. Id. at 1579.
153. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See supra note 84 and accorhpanying text.
154. See supra notes 78, 82-88 and accompanying text.
155. The purpose of any enactment may not be the advancement of religion. Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
156. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
158. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). See In re Watson, [1973] 1
W.L.R. 1472, 1482 (Ch.).
159. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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of the community'"0 and, in England, by promoting religion within
the community. 161
Congregations failing the theism test may advance those aims
as well as congregations with creeds meeting the test. The court in
In re South Place Ethical Society acknowledged: "There is no doubt
at all that the members of the society are sincere people of the
highest integrity."'' 62 The pluralism of the community is ill served
by a test that promotes only one type of group to minister to the
spiritual needs of the community. Even the advancement of reli-
gion itself is impeded by the theism test. The impossibility of defin-
ing God 16 3 and the acknowledgement that religion can exist without
a judicially cognizable God, as Buddhism does, 16 4 imply that the
theism test inhibits rather than advances some religions.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE
Analogy tests, used by a number of American jurisdictions,' 5
better serve the purposes of the exemption by focusing on an institu-
tion's place in its community instead of focusing on its internal
workings. Generally, such tests consider all the facts of a case, and
no single factor or group of factors is dispositive.16 Briefly, the test
160. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
162. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565, 1569 (Ch.). The court also noted that the Society provides
lectures, discussions and concerts of a very high standard, all open to the public. Id.
163. See supra notes 121-37 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
165. E.g., Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394
(1957); Ideal Life Church v. Washington County, 304 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1981).
166. Ideal Life Church v. Washington County, 304 N.W.2d 308, 315 (Minn. 1981).
After noting that all factors must be considered, the court noted eight specific factors it
considered in that case:
1. In substance, the. . . primary, if not the sole, motive behind Petitioner's organi-
zation and operation was tax avoidance ....
2. Petitioner's doctrine and beliefs, such as they are, are intentionally vague and
non-binding upon its members.
3. Petitioner's members freely continue to practice other religions.
4. Petitioner has no formally trained or ordained ministry.
5. Petitioner has no sacraments, rituals, education courses or literature of its own.
6. Petitioner has no liturgy, other than simple meetings which resemble mere social
gatherings or discussion groups rather than religious worship.
7. Petitioner is not an institution which advances religion (as that term is commonly
understood) as a way of life for all men.
8. Petitioner does not require a belief in any Supreme Being or beings.
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is whether the institution fills the same place in the community and
in the lives of its members as institutions qualifying for the exemp-
tion.167 The United States Supreme Court adopted a similar test for
determining conscientious objector status in United States v.
Seeger. 168
The courts can administer such a test more easily to determine
the role of an institution in the community than to determine the
nature and role of an individual's beliefs, as required by Seeger.
While objective evidence may be almost entirely lacking in a
Seeger type situation, it generally abounds where the question is an
institution's place in the community. Such evidence would include
the following: the frequency and type of meetings, 69 the institu-
tion's place in traditionally church-centered events such as marriage
and the naming of babies, 170 the existence of a creed or spiritual
guidance,' 71 the publicness of the institution, 172 the education of its
clergy173 and any others the court finds relevant.174
Courts in England and America using the theism test to deter-
mine the nature of the sect, use a type of analogy test to determine
if the land is being used in the manner prescribed by the statute. 175
Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Wahl criticized the majority's ennumeration of specific
factors as insufficiently flexible, id. at 319-20, and suggested a more amorphous analogy. Id.
The majority's repeated insistence that "all relevant factors in each case" be considered, id. at
315, removes its analysis from the dangers anticipated by Justice Wahl.
167. Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 698, 315
P.2d 394, 409-10 (1957).
168. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
169. Compare Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 128
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (weekly meetings with readings, sermons, singing and meditation) with
Ideal Life Church v. County of Washington, 304 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Minn. 1981) (monthly
meetings where members discuss world affairs and "get things off their chests").
170. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657, 658 (Ga. 1982)
(marriages, funerals and naming of babies).
171. Compare In re South Place Ethical Soc'y, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565, 1569 (Ch.) (belief
in the excellence of truth, love and beauty, but not in anything supernatural) with Ideal Life
Church, 304 N.W.2d at 311 (bylaws and "Doctrine" adopted after failure to obtain tax
exemption) and United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968) (Church motto:
"Victory over Horseshit").
172. See, e.g., Parshall Christian Order, R.E. v. Board of Review, 315 N.W.2d 798,
802 (Iowa 1982) (order included only members of nuclear family).
173. Compare Roberts, 292 S.E.2d at 658 (10 years of training for head of church) with
Ideal Life Church, 304 N.W.2d at 310 (mail order certificate of ordination received for $20).
174. No single factor is dispositive. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g, Stradling v. Higgins, 1932 Ch. 143, 152 (Ch. 1931) (use of rooms for
secular objects does not disqualify place of worship; court analogized similar uses of parts of
St. Paul's Cathedral); Roberts, 292 S.E.2d at 660.
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Adoption of the analogy test, therefore, would require simply ex-
tending the use of the analogy test to the issue of religion. In
England, the adoption of the analogy test would merely shift the
emphasis of the historic criterion, similarity to the established
church' v7 from theological similarity to functional similarity.
CONCLUSION
The use of the theism test to distinguish religion from other
beliefs results in unequal treatment of different religions and inef-
fective promotion of the purposes of the exemption. Discrimination
among religions contravenes stated policy in England and constitu-
tional mandates in the United States. The treatment of Buddhism
manifests the discriminatory nature of the theism test. Courts re-
quiring theism have considered Buddhism an exception to the rule,
thus admitting the possibility of nontheistic religion. Conversely,
some have noted that Buddhism, and other sects described as non-
theistic by the judiciary, include concepts indistinguishable from
some Christians' conception of God. Either analysis reveals that the
theism test fails to distinguish religion from other beliefs.
The exemption serves several state ends. It aids those groups
that enhance the moral and mental well-being of the community; it
adds to the pluralism of the community and it advances religion,
which is a permissible state purpose in England. All of those ends
are frustrated to some degree by the theism test. An analogy test
better serves the purposes of the exemption because it considers an
institution's place in the life of the community rather than its
internal workings. Courts still using the theism test should abandon
it in favor of the analogy test, which has proved itself a workable
alternative in a number of American jurisdictions.
John E. Jenkins
176. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
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